Zoning ordinances establishing exclusive farm use zones
- definitions
Source:
Section 215.203 — Zoning ordinances establishing exclusive farm use zones; definitions, https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors215.html
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Notes of Decisions
Woodlot was not currently employed as part of whole parcel, and was not surrounded by and did not border on farm use parcel and was therefore not appurtenant. Linfoot v. Dept. of Rev., 4 OTR 489 (1971)
To qualify for assessment for farm use, owner must ultimately receive compensation, in some form, from farming or grazing operations conducted for money profit. Linfoot v. Dept. of Rev., 4 OTR 489 (1971)
Contiguous area of substantial size not used for farm purposes must be denied exemption even though contained within boundaries of qualifying farm operation. Taylor v. Dept. of Rev., 6 OTR 496 (1976)
Buildings used for temporary housing of itinerant farm workers during harvest periods were buildings supporting “accepted farming practices” under this section. Benton v. Dept. of Rev., 7 OTR 162 (1977)
Farm use land includes any land capable of profitable agricultural production regardless of its size under position taken by Oregon Tax Court. Rutherford v. Armstrong, 31 Or App 1319, 572 P2d 1331 (1977), Sup Ct review denied
Where land cannot presently or in foreseeable future be utilized for “farm use” as defined in this section, LCDC goal does not require exclusive farm use zoning upon finding of predominance of certain class soils. Meyer v. Lord, 37 Or App 59, 586 P2d 367 (1978); 1000 Friends v. Benton County, 32 Or App 413, 575 P2d 651 (1978)
Although plaintiff’s attempt to control tansy ragwort could have restored subject property to profitable future activity, such use of property did not constitute “farm use” within the meaning of this section because the land was not currently being used to obtain profits. Shepherd v. Dept. of Rev., 8 OTR 122 (1979)
Homesite located on land zoned for exclusive farm use was not eligible for special assessment. Chapin v. Dept. of Rev., 8 OTR 361 (1980), aff’d 290 Or 931, 627 P2d 480 (1981)
Board of county commissioners’ finding that land for which subdivision was proposed could not “presently or in the foreseeable future be utilized for farm use” as defined in this section was not based on substantial evidence where board did not specifically address possible farm applications other than grazing. Hillcrest Vineyard v. Bd. of Comm. of Douglas County, 45 Or App 285, 608 P2d 201 (1980)
Since former version of this section specifically excepted “use of dwelling customarily provided in conjunction with farm use” from definition of “farm use,” half acre homesite on 111 acre tract zoned Exclusive Farm Use was properly valued as homesite rather than farmland. Chapin v. Dept. of Revenue, 290 Or 931, 627 P2d 480 (1981)
Where plaintiff rented pasture at price of $40 per month for grazing of horses owned by his daughter’s girlfriends, many of whom used their horses in connection with their 4-H projects; there were never more than five or six horses on the property at any one time; and each of the renters was responsible for feeding and care of her own horse, individuals renting pasture were doing so for personal reasons and not for primary purpose of obtaining a profit within the meaning of this section and use of property did not meet definition of “farm use.” Capsey v. Dept. of Revenue, 294 Or 455, 657 P2d 680 (1983)
Farmland that has been destroyed by nonfarm activity may not be classified as “wasteland” for purposes of obtaining farm use assessment. Guido v. Dept. of Rev., 10 OTR 85 (1985)
Although this section has land use regulatory features, the “current employment” requirement was designed only as qualification for favorable tax treatment. Newcomer v. Clackamas County, 92 Or App 174, 758 P2d 369 (1988)
Storage of manure on land other than land where it is produced is not farm use within meaning of this section. J and D Fertilizers, Ltd. v. Clackamas County, 105 Or App 11, 803 P2d 280 (1990), Sup Ct review denied
Boarding of horses for profit is not farm use. Fitzwater v. Dept. of Rev., 12 OTR 48 (1991)
Listing of specific activity as permitted nonfarm use prevents activity from qualifying under broader farm use category, so land used for activity is not in farm use. Kang v. Dept. of Revenue, 12 OTR 407 (1993)
Winery is not farm use. King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 14 OTR 169 (1997), aff’d 329 Or 414, 988 P2d 369 (1999)
“Profit” is measured by direct expenditures and income from use of land and excludes consideration of indirect expenditures and profits. Everhart v. Dept. of Revenue, 15 OTR 76 (1999)
In determining whether land is suitable for “farm use,” factors considered by local government may include net gain or receipts from farm or agricultural activities. Wetherell v. Douglas County, 342 Or 666, 160 P3d 614 (2007)
Where respondent landowner grows, cuts, bales and compresses straw on property, zoned for exclusive farm use, then ships straw to market, respondent engages in “preparation” of straw and respondent’s use of property is “farm use.” Gilmour v. Linn County, 279 Or App 584, 379 P3d 833 (2016)
COMPLETED CITATIONS: Ritch v. Dept. of Rev., 4 OTR 206 (1970), rev’d 261 Or 78, 493 P2d 38 (1972)
Attorney General Opinions
Authority of state over use of land along Willamette River under Greenway Law, (1975) Vol 37, p 515; propriety of establishing aircraft landing field in “farm use zone,” (1975) Vol 37, p 547; effect of constitutional provision requiring payments based on government regulations restricting use of property, (2001) Vol 49, p 284
Law Review Citations
9 WLJ 1-25 (1973); 53 OLR 120, 127 (1974); 19 EL 63 (1988)