Definitions
Source:
Section 163.305 — Definitions, https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors163.html
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Notes of Decisions
Although evidence included a statement by victim made to cause defendant to believe that she was consenting to intercourse, but made with the ultimate motive of opening an avenue for her escape, evidence of rape was sufficient to submit to the jury. State v. Forsyth, 20 Or App 624, 533 P2d 176 (1975)
Under evidence that defendant intentionally touched victim’s buttocks through clothing, whether such conduct constituted “sexual contact” of victim’s “intimate parts” was question for jury. State v. Buller, 31 Or App 889, 581 P2d 1263 (1977)
Legislative intent is that separate sentences are permissible for rape and sodomy offenses arising out of same criminal episode. State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 605 P2d 671 (1980)
In prosecution for violation for ORS 163.425 (sexual abuse in first degree), evidence that defendant was being sexually fondled by his wife and that he attempted to expose himself to children in backseat of his car was probative of sexual arousal and therefore also probative of purpose under this section. State v. Fitch, 47 Or App 205, 615 P2d 372 (1980)
Under this section, any penetration is sufficient to sustain charge of rape. State v. Wolfe, 56 Or App 795, 643 P2d 404 (1982)
Statement by doctor that vagina and outer lips of genitalia of four-year old girl were markedly inflamed and irritated so that he thought it was quite possible she was sexually assaulted was sufficient evidence to establish that penetration “however slight” had occurred. State v. Hollywood, 67 Or App 546, 680 P2d 655 (1984), Sup Ct review denied
Where city’s mandatory minimum penalty is harsher than state’s for same conduct, city’s penalty is invalid as incompatible with state criminal law under Article XI, Section 2 of Oregon Constitution. City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or 490, 714 P2d 220 (1986)
Sexual penetration is not necessary for conduct to constitute “deviate sexual intercourse.” State v. Luttrell, 93 Or App 772, 764 P2d 554 (1988), Sup Ct review denied
For purposes of this section, “intimate parts” of body are parts subjectively intimate to person touched, and which are known by accused to be so or are area of anatomy that would be objectively known to be intimate by any reasonable person. State v. Woodley, 306 Or 458, 760 P2d 884 (1988)
Where jury was entitled to infer from evidence that defendant who was charged with rape in first degree subjected victims to “forcible compulsion,” one element of charged crime in or within one mile of Multnomah County, Multnomah County trial court did not err in rejecting defendant’s lack of venue argument and denying his motion or judgment of acquittal. State v. Sanarrita, 102 Or App 349, 794 P2d 457 (1990)
Ability of mentally defective person to appraise “nature” of conduct depends on person’s understanding of physical aspects of conduct and ability to contemplate and assess moral quality of conduct. State v. Callender, 181 Or App 636, 47 P3d 514 (2002), Sup Ct review denied
Appraisal of conduct by person who is “mentally defective” means exercise of judgment and making of choices based on person’s understanding of nature of person’s own conduct. State v. Reed, 339 Or 239, 118 P3d 791 (2005)
“Intimate parts” of person means body parts that person ordinarily allows to be touched only by other people with whom person has close personal relationship marked by love, ardent liking or mutual cherishing. State v. Meyrovich, 204 Or App 385, 129 P3d 729 (2006), Sup Ct review denied
For act to constitute forcible compulsion by threat, person must directly and distinctly state or express to victim intent to inflict harm. State v. Magel, 246 Or App 725, 268 P3d 666 (2011)
To constitute “forcible compulsion” under section, physical force must be greater in degree or different in kind from simple movement and contact inherent in sexual contact at issue and must be sufficient to compel victim to submit to or engage in sexual contact against the victim’s will. State v. O’Hara, 251 Or App 244, 283 P3d 396 (2012), Sup Ct review denied
Sixteen year old victim, who voluntarily consumed alcohol provided by defendant, and who defendant then sexually assaulted, was not “mentally incapacitated” at time of offense because victim consented to drinking alcohol. That victim was minor does not bear on victim’s ability to consent to drinking alcohol. Burcham v. Franke, 265 Or App 300, 335 P3d 298 (2014)
Law Review Citations
68 OLR 255 (1989)