ORS 163.225
Kidnapping in the second degree


(1)

A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the second degree if, with intent to interfere substantially with another’s personal liberty, and without consent or legal authority, the person:

(a)

Takes the person from one place to another; or

(b)

Secretly confines the person in a place where the person is not likely to be found.

(2)

It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (1) of this section if:

(a)

The person taken or confined is under 16 years of age;

(b)

The defendant is a relative of that person; and

(c)

The sole purpose of the person is to assume control of that person.

(3)

Kidnapping in the second degree is a Class B felony. [1971 c.743 §98; 2005 c.22 §111]

Source: Section 163.225 — Kidnapping in the second degree, https://www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/bills_laws/ors/ors163.­html.

Notes of Decisions

Movement of a victim from an automobile parked on the service station lot to the station building on the lot was asportation. State v. Talbot, 24 Or App 379, 545 P2d 599 (1976)

Evidence, inter alia, that defendant was a stranger to victim, that victim had left her car in haste, and that victim’s body was discovered some distance from car, was sufficient to support finding of second degree kidnapping. State v. Nulph, 31 Or App 1115, 572 P2d 642 (1977), Sup Ct review denied

Kidnapping was not merely incident to transaction involving also robbery and sodomy where defendant drove victim’s car several miles with bound victim in back seat. State v. Steele, 33 Or App 491, 577 P2d 524 (1978), Sup Ct review denied

California bail bondsmen took person from one place to another “without consent or legal authority” within meaning of this section where they pursued and captured bail violator in Oregon and returned him to custody of California court. State v. Epps, 36 Or App 519, 585 P2d 425 (1978), Sup Ct review denied

Where indictment alleged that defendant took child from its mother at direction of father and father had right to custody, taking was with consent of lawful custodian, and thus defendant could not be indicted under this section. State v. Edmiston, 43 Or App 13, 602 P2d 282 (1979)

Where defendant pursued victim, seized her and carried her to other side of road and attempted to force her down beside some shrubbery, finder of fact could fairly have inferred that defendant intended to interfere substantially with victim’s personal liberty within meaning of this section. State v. Cazares, 44 Or App 621, 606 P2d 688 (1980), Sup Ct review denied

Evidence that, inter alia, defendant grabbed and slapped victim, threw her in car and held her down while he drove out of town was sufficient to show lack of consent to transportation. State v. Dorsey, 44 Or App 721, 607 P2d 204 (1980)

Where defendant drove victim substantial distance in his pickup truck and detained her for over eight hours, this was not type of minimal displacement incidental to commission of sodomy and failure to merge kidnapping and sodomy convictions and sentences was not error. State v. Bateman, 48 Or App 357, 616 P2d 1206 (1980)

Where victims were tied and gagged and moved around their house but not taken beyond the house or moved a substantial distance, victims were “taken from one place to another” within meaning of this section. State v. Dinkel, 49 Or App 917, 621 P2d 626 (1980)

Legislative intent is that there may be separate conviction and sentence for kidnapping only when it is not incidental to another crime, and it may be found not to be incidental if defendant had intent to interfere substantially with victim’s personal liberty. State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 605 P2d 671 (1980); State v. Thomas, 139 Or App 308, 911 P2d 1237 (1996), Sup Ct review denied

Evidence that defendant concealed victim in bathroom of victim’s apartment and held victim at knifepoint so as to prevent victim from responding to police officer’s knocks was sufficient to support finding that defendant intended to substantially interfere with victim’s personal liberty and that defendant “secretly confined” victim in place where victim was “not likely to be found.” State v. Montgomery, 50 Or App 381, 624 P2d 151 (1981), Sup Ct review denied

Where defendant admitted that during robbery he moved employes and patrons from lounge to another room and kept door locked from five to ten minutes, there was sufficient evidence for rational jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had requisite intent to kidnap. State v. Rendahl, 58 Or App 688, 650 P2d 128 (1982)

Movement of upper two-thirds of victim’s body off driver’s seat of automobile did not meet this section’s requirement of taking person from one place to another. State v. Jefferson, 81 Or App 479, 726 P2d 392 (1986), Sup Ct review denied

Sentencing of defendants separately on convictions for kidnapping and for escape was proper because determination of separate punishment for kidnapping depended on whether defendant intended to interfere substantially with victim’s personal liberty. State v. Allen, 89 Or App 167, 747 P2d 384 (1987), Sup Ct review denied

To convict defendant of kidnapping by deception, prosecution must prove following elements: 1) defendant intended to interfere substantially with another’s personal liberty; 2) defendant made misrepresentation calculated to induce reliance by victim in order to accomplish interference; and 3) victim relied upon misrepresentation in choosing to accompany defendant from one place to another. State v. Amell, 303 Or 355, 736 P2d 561 (1987)

Act of taking person from one place to another and act of secretly confining person in place where not likely to be found violate two separate “statutory provisions” for proving first degree kidnapping. State v. O’Neall, 115 Or App 62, 836 P2d 758 (1992), Sup Ct review denied

There is no de minimis distance required to constitute taking of person from one place to another. State v. Thomas, 139 Or App 308, 911 P2d 1237 (1996), Sup Ct review denied

Offense is “crime of violence” for purposes of federal career offender sentencing guidelines. U.S. v. Williams, 110 F3d 50 (9th Cir. 1997)

Moving victim from one room to another while committing crime other than kidnapping, without intent to move victim farther or take victim to place of confinement, is insufficient to “substantially” interfere with personal liberty. State v. Wolleat, 338 Or 469, 111 P3d 1131 (2005)

“Liberty” interest this section protects from interference is interest in freedom of movement. State v. Wolleat, 338 Or 469, 111 P3d 1131 (2005)

Moving victim short distance in course of committing other crime does not constitute kidnapping unless defendant intended transporting victim greater distance than was accomplished or transporting victim to place of confinement. State v. Wolleat, 338 Or 469, 111 P3d 1131 (2005); State v. Claborn, 214 Or App 166, 162 P3d 374 (2007), Sup Ct review denied

Whether defendant had intent to substantially interfere with liberty of victim may be determined by considering both movement of victim and confinement of victim. State v. Nguyen, 221 Or App 440, 190 P3d 462 (2008), modified 228 Or App 241, 206 P3d 1219 (2009), Sup Ct review denied; State v. Mejia, 348 Or 1, 227 P3d 1139 (2010)

Asportation element of kidnapping is not met where actual distance victim is moved is not substantial and situation and context are same. State v. Odnorozhenko, 224 Or App 288, 197 P3d 562 (2008)

Determination of whether victim is moved “from one place to another” is situational and contextual and depends on multiple factors, including distance, limitation of personal freedom and increase in isolation. State v. Walch, 346 Or 463, 213 P3d 1201 (2009)

Person does not commit repeated violations of this provision by repeatedly taking victim from one place to another. State v. Gerlach, 255 Or App 614, 300 P3d 193 (2013), Sup Ct review denied

Where defendant during course of robbery forced victims at gunpoint from attached garage into bedroom inside house and from one bedroom to another bedroom defendant’s conduct was insufficient to establish asportation element of kidnapping under this section. State v. Ibabao, 270 Or App 508, 348 P3d 336 (2015)

Where defendant and victim checked into motel room, motel manager and others knew that defendant and victim had checked into room, defendant attacked victim throughout evening and threatened victim with further violence if victim called for help when visitors knocked on door, defendant secretly confined victim. State v. Vaughan-France, 279 Or App 305, 379 P3d 766 (2016), Sup Ct review denied

Law Review Citations

51 OLR 486, 490-492 (1972); 15 WLR 23 (1978)

163.005
Criminal homicide
163.095
“Aggravated murder” defined
163.105
Sentencing options for aggravated murder
163.107
Murder in the first degree
163.109
Alternative proof of certain victims of murder in the first degree
163.111
Pleading, proof and stipulation regarding previous conviction element in prosecution for murder in the first degree
163.115
Murder in the second degree
163.117
Causing or aiding suicide as defense to charge of murder
163.118
Manslaughter in the first degree
163.125
Manslaughter in the second degree
163.135
Extreme emotional disturbance as affirmative defense to murder in the second degree
163.145
Criminally negligent homicide
163.147
Crime category classification for manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide
163.149
Aggravated vehicular homicide
163.150
Sentencing for aggravated murder
163.155
Sentencing for murder of pregnant victim
163.160
Assault in the fourth degree
163.165
Assault in the third degree
163.168
Crime category classification for assault in the third degree
163.175
Assault in the second degree
163.185
Assault in the first degree
163.187
Strangulation
163.190
Menacing
163.191
Intimidation by display of a noose
163.192
Endangering a person protected by a Family Abuse Prevention Act restraining order
163.193
Assisting another person to commit suicide
163.195
Recklessly endangering another person
163.196
Aggravated driving while suspended or revoked
163.197
Hazing
163.200
Criminal mistreatment in the second degree
163.205
Criminal mistreatment in the first degree
163.206
Exceptions to criminal mistreatment
163.207
Female genital mutilation
163.208
Assaulting a public safety officer
163.211
Definitions for ORS 163.211 to 163.213
163.212
Unlawful use of an electrical stun gun, tear gas or mace in the second degree
163.213
Unlawful use of an electrical stun gun, tear gas or mace in the first degree
163.215
Definitions for ORS 163.215 to 163.257
163.225
Kidnapping in the second degree
163.235
Kidnapping in the first degree
163.245
Custodial interference in the second degree
163.257
Custodial interference in the first degree
163.261
Definitions for ORS 163.263 and 163.264
163.263
Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the second degree
163.264
Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the first degree
163.266
Trafficking in persons
163.269
Victim assertion of defense of duress
163.275
Coercion
163.285
Defense to coercion
163.305
Definitions
163.315
Incapacity to consent
163.325
Ignorance or mistake as a defense
163.345
Age as a defense in certain cases
163.355
Rape in the third degree
163.365
Rape in the second degree
163.375
Rape in the first degree
163.385
Sodomy in the third degree
163.395
Sodomy in the second degree
163.405
Sodomy in the first degree
163.408
Unlawful sexual penetration in the second degree
163.411
Unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree
163.412
Exceptions to unlawful sexual penetration prohibition
163.413
Purchasing sex with a minor
163.415
Sexual abuse in the third degree
163.425
Sexual abuse in the second degree
163.426
Crime category classification for sexual abuse in the second degree
163.427
Sexual abuse in the first degree
163.431
Definitions for ORS 163.431 to 163.434
163.432
Online sexual corruption of a child in the second degree
163.433
Online sexual corruption of a child in the first degree
163.434
Provisions applicable to online sexual corruption of a child
163.435
Contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor
163.445
Sexual misconduct
163.448
Definitions for ORS 163.452 and 163.454
163.452
Custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree
163.454
Custodial sexual misconduct in the second degree
163.465
Public indecency
163.466
Classification of felony public indecency
163.467
Private indecency
163.472
Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image
163.476
Unlawfully being in a location where children regularly congregate
163.479
Unlawful contact with a child
163.505
Definitions for certain provisions of ORS 163.505 to 163.575
163.515
Bigamy
163.525
Incest
163.535
Abandonment of a child
163.537
Buying or selling a person under 18 years of age
163.545
Child neglect in the second degree
163.547
Child neglect in the first degree
163.555
Criminal nonsupport
163.565
Evidence of parentage
163.575
Endangering the welfare of a minor
163.577
Failing to supervise a child
163.580
Display of sign concerning sale of smoking devices
163.665
Definitions
163.670
Using child in display of sexually explicit conduct
163.676
Exemption from prosecution under ORS 163.684
163.682
Exceptions to ORS 163.665 to 163.693
163.684
Encouraging child sexual abuse in the first degree
163.686
Encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree
163.687
Encouraging child sexual abuse in the third degree
163.688
Possession of materials depicting sexually explicit conduct of a child in the first degree
163.689
Possession of materials depicting sexually explicit conduct of a child in the second degree
163.690
Lack of knowledge of age of child as affirmative defense
163.693
Failure to report child pornography
163.700
Invasion of personal privacy in the second degree
163.701
Invasion of personal privacy in the first degree
163.702
Exceptions to ORS 163.700 and 163.701
163.705
Polygraph examination of victims in certain criminal cases prohibited
163.707
Forfeiture of motor vehicle used in drive-by shooting
163.709
Unlawful directing of light from a laser pointer
163.715
Unlawful use of a global positioning system device
163.730
Definitions for ORS 30.866 and 163.730 to 163.750
163.732
Stalking
163.735
Citation
163.738
Effect of citation
163.741
Service of stalking protective order
163.744
Initiation of action seeking citation
163.750
Violating a court’s stalking protective order
163.753
Immunity of officer acting in good faith
163.755
Conduct for which stalking protective order may not be issued
163.760
Definitions for ORS 163.760 to 163.777
163.763
Petition to circuit court for relief
163.765
Restraining order
163.767
Hearing
163.770
Appearance by telephone or electronic communication device
163.773
Enforcement of restraining order
163.775
Renewal and modification of restraining order
163.777
Fees or undertaking may not be required
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