2017 ORS 19.205¹
Appealable judgments and orders

(1) Unless otherwise provided by law, a limited judgment, general judgment or supplemental judgment, as those terms are defined by ORS 18.005 (Definitions), may be appealed as provided in this chapter. A judgment corrected under ORCP 71 may be appealed only as provided in ORS 18.107 (Corrections to civil judgments) and 18.112 (Correction of designation of judgment as general judgment).

(2) An order in an action that affects a substantial right, and that effectively determines the action so as to prevent a judgment in the action, may be appealed in the same manner as provided in this chapter for judgments.

(3) An order that is made in the action after a general judgment is entered and that affects a substantial right, including an order granting a new trial, may be appealed in the same manner as provided in this chapter for judgments.

(4) No appeal to the Court of Appeals shall be taken or allowed in any action for the recovery of money or damages only unless it appears from the pleadings that the amount in controversy exceeds $250.

(5) An appeal may be taken from the circuit court in any special statutory proceeding under the same conditions, in the same manner and with like effect as from a judgment or order entered in an action, unless appeal is expressly prohibited by the law authorizing the special statutory proceeding.

(6) Nothing in ORS chapter 18 affects the authority of an appellate court to dismiss an appeal or to remand a proceeding to the trial court under ORS 19.270 (Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals) (4) based on the appellate court’s determination that the appeal has not been taken from an appealable judgment or order. [Formerly 19.010; 2003 c.576 §85]

(formerly 19.010)

Notes of Decisions

In General

An order denying a mo­tion to dismiss is not final and does not fall within the pro­vi­sions of this sec­tion. Green v. Lilly Enterprises, Inc., 273 Or 952, 544 P2d 169 (1975)

Court of Appeals lacked jurisdic­tion to review order sustaining demurrer to complaint. J. Gregcin, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 287 Or 709, 601 P2d 1254 (1979)

Where trial court issued order awarding partial summary judg­ment in favor of plaintiff on issue of liability but no judg­ment was entered after order, order was not final judg­ment within meaning of this sec­tion, and court had discre­tion to vacate it. Journeymen, Inc. v. Judson, 45 Or App 249, 608 P2d 563 (1980), Sup Ct review denied

Where court set aside verdict without entering judg­ment, order granting new trial was not ap­pealable and lack of jurisdic­tion could not be cured by dating judg­ment nunc pro tuncas of date prior to notice of ap­peal. Mangus v. Progress Quarries, 290 Or 377, 622 P2d 319 (1981)

Order of circuit court providing that “Court is not re­quired to answer ques­tions of the nature asked by plaintiff in his Declaratory Judg­ment and will not answer said ques­tions” is non-ap­pealable and ap­peal was dismissed on court’s own mo­tion for want of jurisdic­tion. Meyer v. Joseph, 295 Or 588, 668 P2d 1228 (1983)

Order granting defendants’ mo­tion in its entirety and dismissing complaint without leave to replead was not final order within meaning of paragraph (2)(a) of this sec­tion; an “order” cannot take the place of a “judg­ment or decree.” City of Portland v. Carriage Inn, 296 Or 191, 673 P2d 531 (1983)

Order denying mo­tion for relief from contempt order is func­tionally identical to mo­tion to vacate an order and is not ap­pealable. State ex rel Washington County v. Betschart, 72 Or App 692, 697 P2d 206 (1985)

Court order allowing execu­tion on judg­ment was not a final order affecting substantial right; all rights had been finally adjudicated by dissolu­tion decree under ORS 107.105 (Provisions of judgment). Foster and Foster, 74 Or App 282, 701 P2d 1053 (1985)

Neither “order” directing per­sonal representative to pay pre­vi­ously allowed claim nor “judg­ment-order” denying objec­tion to claim underlying first order was ap­pealable in circumstances of this case. Goeddertz v. Parchen, 299 Or 277, 701 P2d 781 (1985)

Where trial judge entered one order declaring that decedent had died intestate and an­oth­er order dismissing peti­tion for reconsidera­tion, ap­peal was premature because no judg­ment had been entered. Mitchell v. Estate of Mitchell, 84 Or App 58, 733 P2d 456 (1987)

Judg­ment dismissing ac­tion was ap­pealable. Austin Mutual Ins. Co. v. Madril, 94 Or App 219, 764 P2d 1378 (1988)

Award of attorney fees is itself to be considered judg­ment and is thus ap­pealable. Marquez v. Meyers, 96 Or App 214, 772 P2d 437 (1989)

Where defendant was not party to mur­der trial and thus could not have ap­pealed any judg­ment entered therein and where mandamus would be impractical, defendant’s only opportunity to raise issue of validity of underlying order was by ap­pealing judg­ments of contempt. State v. Nefstad, 99 Or App 12, 781 P2d 358 (1989), Sup Ct review denied

Order denying entry of arbitra­tion decision and award and granting trial de novo is not ap­pealable final order. Cessna v. Chu-R&T, Inc., 185 Or App 39, 57 P3d 936 (2002), Sup Ct review denied

Order denying post-judg­ment mo­tion for DNA testing under ORS 138.690 (Motion) is not civil in nature and, thus, is not ap­pealable under this pro­vi­sion. State v. Johnson, 254 Or App 447, 295 P3d 677 (2013), Sup Ct review denied

Where case was presented three times to jury and each time resulted in mistrial and no judg­ment was reached, trial court has not “effectively determined” ac­tion to justify ap­peal under this sec­tion. Taylor v. Portland Adventist Medical Center, 269 Or App 151, 344 P3d 119 (2015), Sup Ct review denied

“A judg­ment or decree”

An order denying a mo­tion to dismiss a peti­tion is not a judg­ment or decree, and is not ap­pealable. Children’s Serv. Div. v. Zach, 18 Or App 288, 525 P2d 185 (1974)

A mere order of default alone when no judg­ment has been entered does not dispose of the case with finality and is not ap­pealable. Union Oil Co. of Calif. v. Linn-Benton Distrib. Co., 270 Or 588, 528 P2d 520 (1974)

Orders are not ap­pealable until the controversy is completely and finally settled in the trial court; overruling Salem King’s Products Co. v. LaFollette, 100 Or 11, 196 P 416 (1921). Moran v. Lewis, 274 Or 631, 547 P2d 627 (1976)

Order of abate­ment of arbitra­tion is not a judg­ment for purpose of ap­peal. Brodine v. Employ­ment Exchange, Inc., 33 Or App 237, 576 P2d 384 (1978), Sup Ct review denied

Order signed by trial court stating that defendant’s mo­tion for judg­ment notwithstanding verdict was allowed was not “judg­ment or decree” which could be reviewed on ap­peal. Ragnone v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 289 Or 339, 613 P2d 1052 (1980)

Entry of final judg­ment, without any express pro­vi­sion to contrary, terminates pendente lite restraining order by defini­tion and thus lower court had no authority to compel husband to do anything after final judg­ment. Sletager and Sletager, 97 Or App 448, 776 P2d 584 (1989)

Trial court’s order denying mo­tion to reconsider is not ap­pealable. Douglas Na­tional Bank v. Becker, 102 Or App 143, 792 P2d 1246 (1990)

Trial court order denying mo­tion for entry of judg­ment is judg­ment for purpose of being reviewed on ap­peal. Gillespie v. Kononen, 310 Or 272, 797 P2d 361 (1990)

Where docu­ment is titled as judg­ment, whether judg­ment is ap­pealable is determined by substance of disposi­tion in docu­ment, not by labeling employed by court. Galfano v. KTVL-TV, 196 Or App 425, 102 P3d 766 (2004)

“An order affecting a substantial right, and which in effect determines the ac­tion or suit”

Order sustaining demurrer to counterclaim is not ap­pealable. Gen. Constr. Co. v. Fish Comm., 19 Or App 485, 528 P2d 122 (1974)

Order denying mo­tion for interven­tion is not ap­pealable. Gen. Constr. Co. v. Fish Comm., 19 Or App 485, 528 P2d 122 (1974)

Summary judg­ment for plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaim is not final, ap­pealable order. Central Lincoln PUD v. Mountain Air Helicopters, 31 Or App 1315, 572 P2d 662 (1977)

An appellate court lacks jurisdic­tion over an ap­peal prematurely filed even though there has been a final order from which there could have been an ap­peal. Johnson v. Assured Employ­ment, 277 Or 11, 558 P2d 228 (1977)

Order entered in dissolu­tion pro­ceed­ing declaring husband to be father of wife’s child did not “determine suit so as to prevent decree therein,” and order was not reviewable where decree of dissolu­tion had not been entered. Williams and Williams, 37 Or App 169, 586 P2d 381 (1978)

Where plaintiff ap­pealed partial summary judg­ment, dismissal of this ap­peal did not prevent further ap­peal where plaintiff had sought to file amended complaint after granting of summary judg­ment and before dismissal of ap­peal. Thunderbird Motel v. City of Portland, 40 Or App 697, 596 P2d 994 (1979), Sup Ct review denied

In contract ac­tion, order denying stay pending appraiser’s valua­tion precluded appraisal but not judicial ac­tion, and thus was not “judg­ment” subject to 30-day ap­peal limita­tion under [former] ORS 19.026. Budget Rent-A-Car v. Todd Invest­ment Co., 43 Or App 519, 603 P2d 1199 (1979)

Decree was not final and ap­pealable where, inter alia, it provided that trial court retained jurisdic­tion of matter until escrow was closed, plaintiff could apply to court for supple­mental decree transferring deed if defendant failed to execute it or escrow instruc­tions, and decision on award of attorney fees was reserved. David M. Scott Construc­tion v. Farrell, 285 Or 563, 592 P2d 551 (1979)

Order allowing mo­tion for summary judg­ment is not ap­pealable. Cenci v. The Ellison Company, 289 Or 603, 617 P2d 254 (1980)

Order forfeiting motor vehicle following defendant’s con­vic­­tion on charge of unlawful pos­ses­sion of controlled substance was final order affecting substantial right creating appellate jurisdic­tion. State v. Curran, 291 Or 119, 628 P2d 1198 (1981)

Although order requiring appellant to refund $100,000 paid himself as attorney’s fees to the conservator’s estate placed him in a difficult posi­tion, it does not decree a final distribu­tion of the estate nor terminate the conservatorship and thus the order is not ap­pealable. Harrington v. Thomas, 63 Or App 292, 663 P2d 1298 (1983), Sup Ct review denied

Since denial of mo­tion to intervene practically determines ac­tion so as to prevent judg­ment on intervenor’s claim or de­fense, denial is immediately ap­pealable. Samuels v. Hubbard, 71 Or App 481, 692 P2d 700 (1984), Sup Ct review denied

State­ment of partial satisfac­tion of judg­ment by reason of Personal Injury Protec­tion reimburse­ment pay­ments is ap­pealable as “final order affecting a substantial right”. Dougherty v. Gelco Express Corp., 79 Or App 490, 719 P2d 906 (1986)

No continuing triable controversy existed when there was final judg­ment where court dismissed first claim with prejudice and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed sec­ond claim, which arose out of same aggregate of operative facts. Woods v. First American Title Ins. Co., 104 Or App 100, 798 P2d 1121 (1990), Sup Ct review denied

Order dismissing complaint was not subject to appellate review because order permitted judg­ment rather than denied judg­ment. Kelley v. City of Gresham, 126 Or App 733, 870 P2d 845 (1994)

Order on mo­tion to replace per­sonal representative of estate is ap­pealable. Amundson v. Brookshire, 133 Or App 450, 891 P2d 710 (1995)

Order denying fee waiver for indigent plaintiff is ap­pealable. Stanwood v. Multnomah County, 135 Or App 58, 898 P2d 196 (1995)

Interlocutory Orders or Decrees

An order quashing service is not an ap­pealable order. Vanecek v. Vanecek, 16 Or App 173, 517 P2d 1206 (1974)

An interlocutory partial summary judg­ment pursuant to ORCP 47C is not a final ap­pealable judg­ment. Raykovich v. Wilkinson, 59 Or App 560, 651 P2d 747 (1982)

Order for new trial is not order preventing entry of judg­ment. Gentry v. Brian Clopton Excavating, Inc., 214 Or App 396, 164 P3d 1225 (2007)

Order Made After Judg­ment or Decree

The receivership court’s entry approving the master’s recommenda­tion concerning pay­ment of claims is a “final order.” Dean v. Exotic Veneers, Inc., 271 Or 188, 531 P2d 266 (1975)

An order dismissing a third party complaint after summary judg­ment in favor of the third party defendant is not ap­pealable prior to the termina­tion of the main ac­tion. Lulay v. Earle, Wolfer, 278 Or 511, 564 P2d 1045 (1977)

Where there was dispute over carrying out prop­erty division decreed as part of dissolu­tion of marriage, order for accounting was not ap­pealable “final decree.” Linder and Linder, 44 Or App 153, 605 P2d 714 (1980)

Where, in original filia­tion pro­ceed­ings, issue of support was continued, and order provided that in event no agree­ment on support was reached, hearing could be held upon mo­tion of either party, order was not final and enforceable. State ex rel Adult and Family Services v. Copeland, 45 Or App 35, 607 P2d 222 (1980), Sup Ct review denied

Order denying mo­tion to vacate ap­pealable judg­ment, decree or order is not ap­pealable unless mo­tion is made on ground that judg­ment is void or that it was entered as result of mis­take, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Fehrenbacher v. Fehrenbacher, 76 Or App 244, 708 P2d 1197 (1985)

Although arbitra­tion award was not ap­pealable, refusal of court to set aside judg­ment based on arbitra­tion award was ap­pealable post-judg­ment order. Green Seasons Turf v. Shiva’s Restaurant Corp., 125 Or App 227, 864 P2d 1345 (1993)

Where judg­ment was entered without trial being held, order setting aside judg­ment is not ap­pealable as order granting new trial. Mann and Mann, 171 Or App 75, 15 P3d 42 (2000)

Order entered after judg­ment and affecting substantial right is ap­pealable, whether or not it is final order. Bhattacharyya v. City of Tigard, 212 Or App 529, 159 P3d 320 (2007)

Amount In Controversy

Peti­tioner’s challenge to constitu­tionality of small claims judg­ment was ap­pealable, notwithstanding that claim in ques­tion was less than $250. Carden v. Johnson, 282 Or 169, 577 P2d 513 (1978)

Where plaintiff alleges sufficient amount in controversy to make ac­tion ap­pealable, answer that asserts lesser amount in controversy is presumed denied by plaintiff and does not divest appellate court of jurisdic­tion. Beckett v. Olson, 75 Or App 610, 707 P2d 635 (1985)

Order granting mo­tion to set aside summary judg­ment is an ap­pealable judg­ment or decree and is equivalent to order granting “new trial” within statute allowing ap­peal from order setting aside judg­ment granting new trial. Carter v. U.S. Na­tional Bank, 304 Or 538, 747 P2d 980 (1987)

Order issued under ORS 151.487 (Ability to pay) for pay­ment of appointed counsel costs is not “ac­tion” subject to require­ment that amount in controversy be more than $250. State v. Shank, 206 Or App 280, 136 P3d 101 (2006)

Special Statutory Proceeding

Expunc­tion of crim­i­nal record is special statutory pro­ceed­ing permitting ap­peal by state. State v. Young, 24 Or App 5, 544 P2d 179 (1976), Sup Ct review denied

A proba­tion revoca­tion hearing is not a special statutory pro­ceed­ing within the meaning of this sec­tion. State v. Baxley, 27 Or App 73, 555 P2d 782 (1976)

Neither this sec­tion nor ORS 138.060 (3) grants the state the right to ap­peal a suppression order. State v. Baxley, 27 Or App 73, 555 P2d 782 (1976)

Order entered pursuant to [former] ORS 33.230 directing parties to proceed with arbitra­tion is not one which determines the ac­tion or suit so as to prevent a judg­ment or decree, but is rather a pro­ce­dure “ancillary” to special pro­ceed­ing and ap­peal may only be taken after entry of judg­ment on arbitra­tion award. Peter Kiewit v. Port of Portland, 291 Or 49, 628 P2d 720 (1981)

Proceeding must be separate from all other judicial pro­ceed­ings to qualify as “special statutory pro­ceed­ing.” State v. Threet, 294 Or 1, 653 P2d 960 (1982)

This sec­tion requires final and complete determina­tion of matter in special pro­ceed­ing before ap­peal is appropriate. Dept. of Rev. v. Universal Foods Corp., 311 Or 537, 815 P2d 1237 (1991)

Appeal of appoint­ment of special conservator must be taken within 30 days of entry of order. Connell v. Franklin, 120 Or App 414, 852 P2d 924 (1993), aff’d as modified 123 Or App 68, 858 P2d 911 (1993), Sup Ct review denied

Court decision upholding Depart­ment of Justice investigative demand under Unlawful Trade Practices Act was ap­pealable. Garganese v. Dept. of Justice, 318 Or 181, 864 P2d 364 (1993); Vendall Marketing Corp. v. Dept. of Justice, 318 Or 189, 863 P2d 1263 (1993)

Abuse Preven­tion Act pro­ceed­ing is special statutory pro­ceed­ing subject to de novo review. Strother and Strother, 130 Or App 624, 883 P2d 249 (1994), Sup Ct review denied

Post-trial order denying mo­tion to seal de­fense expense records is ap­pealable. State v. Cunningham, 161 Or App 345, 985 P2d 827 (1999)

Federal law based on congressional power to regulate interstate commerce cannot provide basis to ap­peal interlocutory order. Bush v. Paragon Property, Inc., 165 Or App 700, 997 P2d 882 (2000)

Special statutory pro­ceed­ing is separate and distinct from other pro­ceed­ing sharing same case name and number if each pro­ceed­ing is func­tionally independent of other pro­ceed­ing. State v. Branstetter, 332 Or 389, 29 P3d 1121 (2001)

Chapter 19

Notes of Decisions

This chapter does not apply to workers’ compensa­tion pro­ceed­ings since it governs appellate review of lower court decisions and not decisions of administrative tribunals. SAIF v. Maddox, 60 Or App 507, 655 P2d 214 (1982), aff’d 295 Or 448, 667 P2d 529 (1983)

1 Legislative Counsel Committee, CHAPTER 19—Appeals, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ors019.­html (2017) (last ac­cessed Mar. 30, 2018).
 
2 Legislative Counsel Committee, Annotations to the Oregon Revised Stat­utes, Cumulative Supplement - 2017, Chapter 19, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ano019.­html (2017) (last ac­cessed Mar. 30, 2018).
 
3 OregonLaws.org assembles these lists by analyzing references between Sections. Each listed item refers back to the current Section in its own text. The result reveals relationships in the code that may not have otherwise been apparent.