2015 ORS 166.165¹
Intimidation in the first degree

(1) Two or more persons acting together commit the crime of intimidation in the first degree, if the persons:

(a)(A) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause physical injury to another person because of the actors’ perception of that person’s race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin; or

(B) With criminal negligence cause physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon because of the actors’ perception of that person’s race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin;

(b) Intentionally, because of the actors’ perception of another person’s race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin, place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury; or

(c) Commit such acts as would constitute the crime of intimidation in the second degree, if undertaken by one person acting alone.

(2) Intimidation in the first degree is a Class C felony. [1981 c.785 §2; 1983 c.521 §2; 1989 c.1029 §2; 1993 c.332 §1; 1995 c.79 §53; 1997 c.249 §50; 2007 c.100 §19; 2011 c.421 §2]

Notes of Decisions

State need not prove that defendant was motivated solely by defendant's percep­tion of victim's race, color, religion, na­tional origin or sexual orienta­tion because this statute creates crim­i­nal liability when unlawful motive plays any role in proscribed con­duct. State v. Hendrix, 107 Or App 734, 813 P2d 1115 (1991), aff'd State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992) and State v. Hendrix, 314 Or 170, 838 P2d 566 (1992)

This statute is not unconstitu­tionally vague. State v. Hendrix, 107 Or App 734, 813 P2d 1115 (1991), aff'd State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992)

Where defendant and an­oth­er were charged and jointly tried for intimida­tion in first de­gree and other per­son was acquitted, defendant could be convicted and sen­tenced only for intimida­tion in sec­ond de­gree. State v. Martin, 109 Or App 483, 818 P2d 1301 (1991)

Because this sec­tion does not proscribe opinions or communica­tions, it does not violate Oregon Constitu­tion, Article I, sec­tion 8. State v. Plowman, 314 Or 157, 838 P2d 558 (1992)

When defendant arrived at store with codefendants who had weapons, observed that one victim spoke little English, heard codefendant's loud and repeated state­ments about victims' race and na­tional origin, continued to beat victims while hearing and after hearing codefendants' state­ments and left with codefendants after beating, evidence es­tab­lished beyond reasonable doubt that defendant had specific intent re­quired under this sec­tion. State v. Hendrix, 314 Or 170, 838 P2d 566 (1992)

Law Review Cita­tions

18 WLR 197 (1982); 28 WLR 455 (1992); 71 OLR 689 (1992); 72 OLR 157 (1993); 29 WLR 763 (1993)

Chapter 166

Law Review Cita­tions

51 OLR 427-637 (1972); 69 OLR 169 (1990)


1 Legislative Counsel Committee, CHAPTER 166—Offenses Against Public Order; Firearms and Other Weapons; Racketeering, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ors166.­html (2015) (last ac­cessed Jul. 16, 2016).
 
2 Legislative Counsel Committee, Annotations to the Oregon Revised Stat­utes, Cumulative Supplement - 2015, Chapter 166, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ano166.­html (2015) (last ac­cessed Jul. 16, 2016).
 
3 OregonLaws.org assembles these lists by analyzing references between Sections. Each listed item refers back to the current Section in its own text. The result reveals relationships in the code that may not have otherwise been apparent.