Definitions for ORS 164.205 to 164.270
Source:
Section 164.205 — Definitions for ORS 164.205 to 164.270, https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors164.html
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Notes of Decisions
Farm shed which was large enough to hold several trucks was “building” within meaning of section. State v. Essig, 31 Or App 639, 571 P2d 170 (1977), Sup Ct review denied
Railway boxcar was not building within meaning of this section. State v. Scott, 38 Or App 465, 590 P2d 743 (1979)
Where church camp building was lived in for eight weeks each summer and was vacant for following 44 weeks, and where burglary occurred months after last occupant left, structure was not “regularly or intermittently” occupied, and thus was not “dwelling” within meaning of this section. State v. Eaton, 43 Or App 469, 602 P2d 1159 (1979), Sup Ct review denied
Mobile home parked in driveway and used intermittently by guests for sleeping was “dwelling” within meaning of this section. State v. McDonald, 77 Or App 267, 712 P2d 163 (1986)
Separate storage units in commercial storage warehouse are “buildings” within meaning of this section. State v. Barker/Phelps, 86 Or App 394, 739 P2d 1045 (1987); State v. Handley, 116 Or App 591, 843 P2d 456 (1992)
“Enter” includes intrusion by instrument if used to enable person introducing instrument to consummate criminal objective. State v. Williams, 127 Or App 574, 873 P2d 471 (1994), Sup Ct review denied
Area within building that lacks discrete means for controlling access and has function encompassed by purpose of building is not separate unit. State v. Jenkins, 157 Or App 156, 969 P2d 1048 (1998)
Where permission for person to enter and remain on premises is conditional, person’s continued presence on premises after failure to comply with condition constitutes remaining unlawfully on premises. State v. Holte, 170 Or App 377, 12 P3d 553 (2000)
Where person has been directed by nonjudicial order to leave public premises, person may raise statutory or constitutional right to remain as defense to charge that person remained unlawfully on premises. State v. Riddell, 172 Or App 675, 21 P3d 128 (2001), Sup Ct review denied
Mere entry onto premises open to public does not constitute failure to leave premises after lawful direction to leave. State v. Collins, 179 Or App 384, 39 P3d 925 (2002)
Where building was temporarily vacant following relatively long period of regular overnight occupancy, building qualified as “dwelling.” State v. Kautz, 179 Or App 458, 39 P3d 937 (2002), Sup Ct review denied
Adaptation of vehicle to business use need not be permanent in order to qualify vehicle as “building.” State v. Nollen, 196 Or App 141, 100 P3d 788 (2004)
City may “lawfully” exclude attendee of ordinary public event held on public property only if attendee has violated valid statute or ordinance. Gathright v. City of Portland, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (D. Or. 2004)
Phrase “lawfully directed,” as used in definition for term “enter,” requires inquiry into lawfulness of direction beyond delegated authority of person issuing direction. State v. Koenig, 238 Or App 297, 242 P3d 649 (2010), Sup Ct review denied
Person does not enter or remain unlawfully when person is invited by tenant of leased or rented property to common area of that property. State v. Schneider, 246 Or App 163, 265 P3d 36 (2011), Sup Ct review denied
When read with ORS 164.225, where defendant entered breezeway that is attached to home, covered, permits access to garage and in which homeowners stored food and other items, defendant entered “dwelling” as used in this section. State v. Taylor, 271 Or App 292, 350 P3d 525 (2015)
Where there was no evidence that any rooms in house where defendant lived with defendant’s parents were rented rooms and occupation of bedroom was not exclusive because defendant had permission to enter bedroom at certain times, fact that bedroom door was locked does not make bedroom “separate building” under this section. State v. Rodriguez, 283 Or App 536, 390 P3d 1104 (2017), Sup Ct review denied
Within single-family home, locked bedroom that was separately rented and that defendant lacked permission to enter constituted separate “building” or “dwelling” for purposes of burglary statutes. State v. Perez-Salas, 312 Or App 693, 492 P3d 95 (2021), Sup Ct review denied
Conex box used by grocery store to store recyclable cans and bottles is “building,” as used in this section. State v. Fitzgerald, 315 Or App 336, 500 P3d 721 (2021), Sup Ct review denied