ORS 163.305
Definitions


As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, unless the context requires otherwise:

(1)

“Forcible compulsion” means to compel by:

(a)

Physical force; or

(b)

A threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of immediate or future death or physical injury to self or another person, or in fear that the person or another person will immediately or in the future be kidnapped.

(2)

“Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered incapable of appraising or controlling the conduct of the person at the time of the alleged offense.

(3)

“Oral or anal sexual intercourse” means sexual conduct between persons consisting of contact between the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.

(4)

“Physically helpless” means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.

(5)

“Sexual contact” means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person or causing such person to touch the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party.

(6)

“Sexual intercourse” has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight; emission is not required. [1971 c.743 §104; 1975 c.461 §1; 1977 c.844 §1; 1979 c.744 §7; 1983 c.500 §1; 1999 c.949 §1; 2009 c.770 §1; 2017 c.318 §2; 2017 c.634 §17; 2021 c.82 §1]
Note: Legislative Counsel has substituted “chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971,” for the words “this Act” in section 104, chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, compiled as 163.305 (Definitions). Specific ORS references have not been substituted, pursuant to 173.160 (Powers and duties of Legislative Counsel in preparing editions for publication). These sections may be determined by referring to the 1971 Comparative Section Table located in Volume 22 of ORS.

Source: Section 163.305 — Definitions, https://www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/bills_laws/ors/ors163.­html.

Notes of Decisions

Although evidence included a statement by victim made to cause defendant to believe that she was consenting to intercourse, but made with the ultimate motive of opening an avenue for her escape, evidence of rape was sufficient to submit to the jury. State v. Forsyth, 20 Or App 624, 533 P2d 176 (1975)

Under evidence that defendant intentionally touched victim’s buttocks through clothing, whether such conduct constituted “sexual contact” of victim’s “intimate parts” was question for jury. State v. Buller, 31 Or App 889, 581 P2d 1263 (1977)

Legislative intent is that separate sentences are permissible for rape and sodomy offenses arising out of same criminal episode. State v. Garcia, 288 Or 413, 605 P2d 671 (1980)

In prosecution for violation for ORS 163.425 (sexual abuse in first degree), evidence that defendant was being sexually fondled by his wife and that he attempted to expose himself to children in backseat of his car was probative of sexual arousal and therefore also probative of purpose under this section. State v. Fitch, 47 Or App 205, 615 P2d 372 (1980)

Under this section, any penetration is sufficient to sustain charge of rape. State v. Wolfe, 56 Or App 795, 643 P2d 404 (1982)

Statement by doctor that vagina and outer lips of genitalia of four-year old girl were markedly inflamed and irritated so that he thought it was quite possible she was sexually assaulted was sufficient evidence to establish that penetration “however slight” had occurred. State v. Hollywood, 67 Or App 546, 680 P2d 655 (1984), Sup Ct review denied

Where city’s mandatory minimum penalty is harsher than state’s for same conduct, city’s penalty is invalid as incompatible with state criminal law under Article XI, Section 2 of Oregon Constitution. City of Portland v. Dollarhide, 300 Or 490, 714 P2d 220 (1986)

Sexual penetration is not necessary for conduct to constitute “deviate sexual intercourse.” State v. Luttrell, 93 Or App 772, 764 P2d 554 (1988), Sup Ct review denied

For purposes of this section, “intimate parts” of body are parts subjectively intimate to person touched, and which are known by accused to be so or are area of anatomy that would be objectively known to be intimate by any reasonable person. State v. Woodley, 306 Or 458, 760 P2d 884 (1988)

Where jury was entitled to infer from evidence that defendant who was charged with rape in first degree subjected victims to “forcible compulsion,” one element of charged crime in or within one mile of Multnomah County, Multnomah County trial court did not err in rejecting defendant’s lack of venue argument and denying his motion or judgment of acquittal. State v. Sanarrita, 102 Or App 349, 794 P2d 457 (1990)

Ability of mentally defective person to appraise “nature” of conduct depends on person’s understanding of physical aspects of conduct and ability to contemplate and assess moral quality of conduct. State v. Callender, 181 Or App 636, 47 P3d 514 (2002), Sup Ct review denied

Appraisal of conduct by person who is “mentally defective” means exercise of judgment and making of choices based on person’s understanding of nature of person’s own conduct. State v. Reed, 339 Or 239, 118 P3d 791 (2005)

“Intimate parts” of person means body parts that person ordinarily allows to be touched only by other people with whom person has close personal relationship marked by love, ardent liking or mutual cherishing. State v. Meyrovich, 204 Or App 385, 129 P3d 729 (2006), Sup Ct review denied

For act to constitute forcible compulsion by threat, person must directly and distinctly state or express to victim intent to inflict harm. State v. Magel, 246 Or App 725, 268 P3d 666 (2011)

To constitute “forcible compulsion” under section, physical force must be greater in degree or different in kind from simple movement and contact inherent in sexual contact at issue and must be sufficient to compel victim to submit to or engage in sexual contact against the victim’s will. State v. O’Hara, 251 Or App 244, 283 P3d 396 (2012), Sup Ct review denied

Sixteen year old victim, who voluntarily consumed alcohol provided by defendant, and who defendant then sexually assaulted, was not “mentally incapacitated” at time of offense because victim consented to drinking alcohol. That victim was minor does not bear on victim’s ability to consent to drinking alcohol. Burcham v. Franke, 265 Or App 300, 335 P3d 298 (2014)

Law Review Citations

68 OLR 255 (1989)

163.005
Criminal homicide
163.095
“Aggravated murder” defined
163.105
Sentencing options for aggravated murder
163.107
Murder in the first degree
163.109
Alternative proof of certain victims of murder in the first degree
163.111
Pleading, proof and stipulation regarding previous conviction element in prosecution for murder in the first degree
163.115
Murder in the second degree
163.117
Causing or aiding suicide as defense to charge of murder
163.118
Manslaughter in the first degree
163.125
Manslaughter in the second degree
163.135
Extreme emotional disturbance as affirmative defense to murder in the second degree
163.145
Criminally negligent homicide
163.147
Crime category classification for manslaughter in the second degree and criminally negligent homicide
163.149
Aggravated vehicular homicide
163.150
Sentencing for aggravated murder
163.155
Sentencing for murder of pregnant victim
163.160
Assault in the fourth degree
163.165
Assault in the third degree
163.168
Crime category classification for assault in the third degree
163.175
Assault in the second degree
163.185
Assault in the first degree
163.187
Strangulation
163.190
Menacing
163.191
Intimidation by display of a noose
163.192
Endangering a person protected by a Family Abuse Prevention Act restraining order
163.193
Assisting another person to commit suicide
163.195
Recklessly endangering another person
163.196
Aggravated driving while suspended or revoked
163.197
Hazing
163.200
Criminal mistreatment in the second degree
163.205
Criminal mistreatment in the first degree
163.206
Exceptions to criminal mistreatment
163.207
Female genital mutilation
163.208
Assaulting a public safety officer
163.211
Definitions for ORS 163.211 to 163.213
163.212
Unlawful use of an electrical stun gun, tear gas or mace in the second degree
163.213
Unlawful use of an electrical stun gun, tear gas or mace in the first degree
163.215
Definitions for ORS 163.215 to 163.257
163.225
Kidnapping in the second degree
163.235
Kidnapping in the first degree
163.245
Custodial interference in the second degree
163.257
Custodial interference in the first degree
163.261
Definitions for ORS 163.263 and 163.264
163.263
Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the second degree
163.264
Subjecting another person to involuntary servitude in the first degree
163.266
Trafficking in persons
163.269
Victim assertion of defense of duress
163.275
Coercion
163.285
Defense to coercion
163.305
Definitions
163.315
Incapacity to consent
163.325
Ignorance or mistake as a defense
163.345
Age as a defense in certain cases
163.355
Rape in the third degree
163.365
Rape in the second degree
163.375
Rape in the first degree
163.385
Sodomy in the third degree
163.395
Sodomy in the second degree
163.405
Sodomy in the first degree
163.408
Unlawful sexual penetration in the second degree
163.411
Unlawful sexual penetration in the first degree
163.412
Exceptions to unlawful sexual penetration prohibition
163.413
Purchasing sex with a minor
163.415
Sexual abuse in the third degree
163.425
Sexual abuse in the second degree
163.426
Crime category classification for sexual abuse in the second degree
163.427
Sexual abuse in the first degree
163.431
Definitions for ORS 163.431 to 163.434
163.432
Online sexual corruption of a child in the second degree
163.433
Online sexual corruption of a child in the first degree
163.434
Provisions applicable to online sexual corruption of a child
163.435
Contributing to the sexual delinquency of a minor
163.445
Sexual misconduct
163.448
Definitions for ORS 163.452 and 163.454
163.452
Custodial sexual misconduct in the first degree
163.454
Custodial sexual misconduct in the second degree
163.465
Public indecency
163.466
Classification of felony public indecency
163.467
Private indecency
163.472
Unlawful dissemination of an intimate image
163.476
Unlawfully being in a location where children regularly congregate
163.479
Unlawful contact with a child
163.505
Definitions for certain provisions of ORS 163.505 to 163.575
163.515
Bigamy
163.525
Incest
163.535
Abandonment of a child
163.537
Buying or selling a person under 18 years of age
163.545
Child neglect in the second degree
163.547
Child neglect in the first degree
163.555
Criminal nonsupport
163.565
Evidence of parentage
163.575
Endangering the welfare of a minor
163.577
Failing to supervise a child
163.580
Display of sign concerning sale of smoking devices
163.665
Definitions
163.670
Using child in display of sexually explicit conduct
163.676
Exemption from prosecution under ORS 163.684
163.682
Exceptions to ORS 163.665 to 163.693
163.684
Encouraging child sexual abuse in the first degree
163.686
Encouraging child sexual abuse in the second degree
163.687
Encouraging child sexual abuse in the third degree
163.688
Possession of materials depicting sexually explicit conduct of a child in the first degree
163.689
Possession of materials depicting sexually explicit conduct of a child in the second degree
163.690
Lack of knowledge of age of child as affirmative defense
163.693
Failure to report child pornography
163.700
Invasion of personal privacy in the second degree
163.701
Invasion of personal privacy in the first degree
163.702
Exceptions to ORS 163.700 and 163.701
163.705
Polygraph examination of victims in certain criminal cases prohibited
163.707
Forfeiture of motor vehicle used in drive-by shooting
163.709
Unlawful directing of light from a laser pointer
163.715
Unlawful use of a global positioning system device
163.730
Definitions for ORS 30.866 and 163.730 to 163.750
163.732
Stalking
163.735
Citation
163.738
Effect of citation
163.741
Service of stalking protective order
163.744
Initiation of action seeking citation
163.750
Violating a court’s stalking protective order
163.753
Immunity of officer acting in good faith
163.755
Conduct for which stalking protective order may not be issued
163.760
Definitions for ORS 163.760 to 163.777
163.763
Petition to circuit court for relief
163.765
Restraining order
163.767
Hearing
163.770
Appearance by telephone or electronic communication device
163.773
Enforcement of restraining order
163.775
Renewal and modification of restraining order
163.777
Fees or undertaking may not be required
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