2015 ORS 161.085¹
Definitions with respect to culpability

As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, and ORS 166.635 (Discharging weapon or throwing objects at trains), unless the context requires otherwise:

(1) "Act" means a bodily movement.

(2) "Voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously and includes the conscious possession or control of property.

(3) "Omission" means a failure to perform an act the performance of which is required by law.

(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

(5) "To act" means either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act.

(6) "Culpable mental state" means intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence as these terms are defined in subsections (7), (8), (9) and (10) of this section.

(7) "Intentionally" or "with intent," when used with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result or to engage in the conduct so described.

(8) "Knowingly" or "with knowledge," when used with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person acts with an awareness that the conduct of the person is of a nature so described or that a circumstance so described exists.

(9) "Recklessly," when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.

(10) "Criminal negligence" or "criminally negligent," when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. [1971 c.743 §7; 1973 c.139 §2]

Note: See note under 161.015 (General definitions).

Notes of Decisions

One cannot "at­tempt" a crime involving an ele­ment of recklessness. State v. Smith, 21 Or App 270, 534 P2d 1180 (1975), Sup Ct review denied

Concepts of "intent" and "knowledge" are distinct and instruc­tion worded in terms of "intent" should not be given in pros­e­cu­­tion for crime where indict­ment alleges "knowledge." State v. Francis, 284 Or 621, 588 P2d 611 (1978)

In trial for first de­gree rape, it was not error for court to fail to give defendant's instruc­tion on statutory defini­tion of "knowingly" under this sec­tion where court did instruct jury on state's burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt and on giving words not specifically defined in instruc­tions their generally known and understood meanings. State v. Bunyea, 44 Or App 611, 606 P2d 685 (1980)

When combined with crim­i­nal negligence standard of this sec­tion, term "adequate physical care" in ORS 163.200 (Criminal mistreatment in the second degree) (crim­i­nal mis­treat­­ment in sec­ond de­gree) is not unconstitu­tionally vague. State v. Damofle/Quintana, 89 Or App 620, 750 P2d 518 (1988), Sup Ct review denied

Where defendant's motive was not relevant to issue of whether he acted "with intent" to conspire to commit crime of burglary or "knowingly" in com­mit­ting crime of burglary and theft under OEC 401, proffered evidence was not admissible as evidence of defendant's state of mind. State v. Troen, 100 Or App 442, 786 P2d 751 (1990), Sup Ct review denied

Trial court did not err in refusing to give requested jury instruc­tion that defined "conscious" because term is understandable without elabora­tion. State v. McDonnell, 313 Or 478, 837 P2d 941 (1992)

Defini­tion of "inten­tionally" also applies to inten­tional mur­der under ORS 163.115 (Murder) and ag­gra­vat­ed felony mur­der under ORS 163.095 ("Aggravated murder" defined). State v. Wille, 317 Or 487, 858 P2d 128 (1993)

Result or circumstance defining of­fense committed by per­son acting "recklessly" is specific to of­fense, therefore reckless ac­tion re­gard­ing one of­fense does not demonstrate reckless ac­tion re­gard­ing related of­fense. State v. Merideth, 149 Or App 164, 942 P2d 803 (1997), Sup Ct review denied

Speech is sufficient bodily move­ment to constitute "voluntary act" and thus is "con­duct." State v. Jessen, 162 Or App 662, 986 P2d 684 (1999), Sup Ct review denied

Defini­tion for "knowingly" addresses only awareness of con­duct or existence of specified circumstances, not result of con­duct. State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 986 P2d 1160 (1999)

"Voluntary act" requires that defendant have ability to choose whether to take particular ac­tion. State v. Tippetts, 180 Or App 350, 43 P3d 455 (2002)

Whether defendant accused of acting recklessly was aware of and consciously disregarded circumstances existing at time of event is fact-specific inquiry for which general standards of care are irrelevant. State v. Curtiss, 193 Or App 348, 89 P3d 1262 (2004), Sup Ct review denied

Law Review Cita­tions

51 OLR 463, 609, 616 (1972)

Law Review Cita­tions

51 OLR 427, 437, 459 (1972); 29 WLR 829 (1993)

Chapter 161

Notes of Decisions

A juvenile court adjudica­tion of whether or not a child committed acts which would be a crim­i­nal viola­tion if committed by an adult must necessarily include an adjudica­tion of all af­firm­a­tive de­fenses that would be available to an adult being tried for the same crim­i­nal viola­tion. State ex rel Juvenile Dept. v. L.J., 26 Or App 461, 552 P2d 1322 (1976)

Law Review Cita­tions

2 EL 237 (1971); 51 OLR 427-637 (1972)

Chapter 161

Criminal Code

(Generally)

Notes of Decisions

Legislature's adop­tion of 1971 Criminal Code did not abolish doctrine of transferred intent. State v. Wesley, 254 Or App 697, 295 P3d 1147 (2013), Sup Ct review denied


1 Legislative Counsel Committee, CHAPTER 161—General Provisions, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ors161.­html (2015) (last ac­cessed Jul. 16, 2016).
 
2 Legislative Counsel Committee, Annotations to the Oregon Revised Stat­utes, Cumulative Supplement - 2015, Chapter 161, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ano161.­html (2015) (last ac­cessed Jul. 16, 2016).
 
3 OregonLaws.org assembles these lists by analyzing references between Sections. Each listed item refers back to the current Section in its own text. The result reveals relationships in the code that may not have otherwise been apparent.