2015 ORS 138.585¹
Access to confidential jury records

(1) A person who files a petition for post-conviction relief under ORS 138.510 (Persons who may file petition for relief) to 138.680 (Short title) and who seeks jury records that are confidential under ORS 10.215 (Master jury list) must either include in the petition a request for access to the confidential records or file a motion in the proceedings seeking access to the confidential records. A motion under this subsection must be filed not later than 90 days before the hearing date for the petition, unless the court allows a later filing for good cause shown. The petition or motion, and any supporting affidavit for the petition or motion, must be served on the trial court administrator for the court that entered the judgment of conviction and on the State Court Administrator. The request for confidential records must:

(a) Specify the purpose for which the jury records are sought; and

(b) Identify with particularity the relevant jury records sought to be released, including the type and time period of the records.

(2) The court in the post-conviction relief proceeding may order release of the jury records if the court finds that:

(a) The jury records sought are likely to produce evidence relevant to a claim of a substantial denial of the petitioner’s rights under the Constitution of the United States, or under the Constitution of the State of Oregon, or both; and

(b) Production of the jury records is not unduly burdensome.

(3) An order under subsection (2) of this section may include, but need not be limited to:

(a) A requirement that the petitioner provide advance payment to the trial court administrator for the court that entered the judgment of conviction and, if applicable, the State Court Administrator for the reasonable costs of providing copies of the jury records; and

(b) Restrictions on further disclosure of the jury records including, but not limited to:

(A) A requirement that the petitioner return all originals and copies to the court at the conclusion of the proceeding;

(B) A requirement that the jury records may be used only for the purpose of supporting the petition for post-conviction relief;

(C) A prohibition against distributing the jury records to a person who is not an agent or representative of the petitioner; and

(D) A prohibition against contacting or attempting to contact the persons whose names appear on the jury records without specific authorization of the court.

(4) The trial court administrator for the court that entered the judgment of conviction or the State Court Administrator may intervene at any time as a matter of right as to any issues relating to the release of jury records under this section.

(5) The procedure established by this section is the exclusive means for compelling production of confidential jury records as evidence in post-conviction relief proceedings. The procedure established by ORS 10.275 (Jury challenges) is the exclusive means for compelling production of confidential jury records as evidence relevant to a challenge to a jury panel under ORS 136.005 (Challenge to jury panel) or ORCP 57A. [2011 c.308 §2]

Notes of Decisions

Any per­son who is convicted of a crime may seek relief under this sec­tion, whether or not he is in custody, regardless of whether his con­vic­­tion is for a felony or misdemeanor. Morasch v. State, 261 Or 299, 493 P2d 1364 (1972)

Habeas corpus is a proper method of ques­tioning the constitu­tionality of treat­ment accorded prisoners. Bekins v. Cupp, 274 Or 115, 545 P2d 861 (1976)

These sec­tions afforded plain, speedy and adequate remedy in lower courts and state Supreme Court would not exercise original habeas corpus jurisdic­tion. Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F2d 233 (1981)

Post-con­vic­­tion relief is not suspension of writ of habeas corpus; it provides different pro­ce­dure but retains all necessary substantive and procedural advantages of the writ. Atkeson v. Cupp, 68 Or App 196, 680 P2d 772 (1984), Sup Ct review denied

Post-con­vic­­tion relief under these sec­tions is available to those convicted of DUII Class A traffic infrac­tions to remedy constitu­tional viola­tions. Evers v. State, 69 Or App 450, 685 P2d 1024 (1984)

Availability of post-con­vic­­tion relief to per­sons convicted under state law but not to those convicted under municipal law does not violate Article I, sec­tion 20, or equal protec­tion clause of Fourteenth Amend­ment, because per­sons convicted under municipal law do not constitute true class, and there is no discriminatory applica­tion of law. Hunter v. State of Oregon, 306 Or 529, 761 P2d 502 (1988)

Granting of delayed ap­peal authorized where necessary to rectify substantial denial of constitu­tional rights. State v. Macy, 316 Or 335, 851 P2d 579 (1993)

Federal constitu­tional principle requiring that facts that increase penalty for crime beyond statutory max­i­mum be submitted to jury does not apply retroactively to afford post-con­vic­­tion relief. Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or 379, 84 P3d 133 (2004)

State will retroactively apply new federal rule re­gard­ing constitu­tionality only if rule places certain kinds of con­duct beyond proscrip­tion or if procedural rule affects funda­mental fairness re­quired for accurate con­vic­­tion. Page v. Palmateer, 336 Or 379, 84 P3d 133 (2004)

Law Review Cita­tions

68 OLR 269 (1989)


1 Legislative Counsel Committee, CHAPTER 138—Appeals; Post-Conviction Relief, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ors138.­html (2015) (last ac­cessed Jul. 16, 2016).
 
2 Legislative Counsel Committee, Annotations to the Oregon Revised Stat­utes, Cumulative Supplement - 2015, Chapter 138, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ano138.­html (2015) (last ac­cessed Jul. 16, 2016).
 
3 OregonLaws.org assembles these lists by analyzing references between Sections. Each listed item refers back to the current Section in its own text. The result reveals relationships in the code that may not have otherwise been apparent.