2017 ORS 12.010¹
Time of commencing actions

Actions shall only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall have accrued, except where a different limitation is prescribed by statute. [Amended by 1979 c.284 §43]

Notes of Decisions

Unless expressly provided otherwise, where statutory amend­ment reduces time for bringing ac­tion, reduc­tion does not act to cut off rights accrued under old law. Bower Trucking and Warehouse Co. v. Multnomah County, 35 Or App 427, 582 P2d 439 (1978)

Where allegedly libelous memorandum was confidential in nature and initial publica­tion was not of type plaintiff would be presumed to know about, cause of ac­tion was deemed to accrue at time plaintiff discovered existence of memorandum. White v. Gurnsey, 48 Or App 931, 618 P2d 975 (1980)

In ac­tion for alleged occupa­tional disease (asbestosis), it was error for trial court to conclude as matter of law that ac­tion accrued under this sec­tion and ORS 12.110 (Actions for certain injuries to person not arising on contract) in December 1975 where medical report in October indicated plaintiff’s condi­tion “should improve without medica­tion” and record amply reflected possibility plaintiff did not know what was causing his illness. Lundy v. Union Carbide Corp., 695 F2d 394 (1982)

Claim for occupa­tional disease accrues when “reasonably prudent per­son associates his symptoms with a serious or permanent condi­tion and at the same time perceives the role which the defendant has played in inducing that condi­tion. Lundy v. Union Carbide Corp., 695 F2d 394 (1982), citing Schiele v. Hobart, 284 Or 483, 587 P2d 1010 (1979)

Statute of limita­tions for tort of inten­tional in­ter­fer­ence with contractual rela­tionship does not depend on date of discovery of in­ter­fer­ence but rather when damages accrued. Cramer v. Stonebridge Inn, 77 Or App 407, 713 P2d 645 (1986)

Determina­tion as to whether ac­tion is “commenced within periods prescribed in this chapter” is subject to ORS 174.120 (Computation of time) method of computing limita­tion period. Stupek v. Wyle Laboratories Corp., 327 Or 433, 963 P2d 678 (1998)

Chapter 12

Notes of Decisions

An ac­tion for per­sonal injuries caused by breach of implied warranty is clearly one for which “different limita­tion is prescribed by statute” under ORS 12.010 (Time of commencing actions) and thus is not governed by pro­vi­sions of this chapter. Redfield v. Mead, Johnson & Co., 266 Or 273, 512 P2d 776 (1973)

1 Legislative Counsel Committee, CHAPTER 12—Limitations of Actions and Suits, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ors012.­html (2017) (last ac­cessed Mar. 30, 2018).
 
2 Legislative Counsel Committee, Annotations to the Oregon Revised Stat­utes, Cumulative Supplement - 2017, Chapter 12, https://­www.­oregonlegislature.­gov/­bills_laws/­ors/­ano012.­html (2017) (last ac­cessed Mar. 30, 2018).
 
3 OregonLaws.org assembles these lists by analyzing references between Sections. Each listed item refers back to the current Section in its own text. The result reveals relationships in the code that may not have otherwise been apparent.